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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
by comparison of the signatures of the owner. Add to this the safety
guaranteed by the assurance fund and the risk is much reduced. In
regard to the rights of heirs, a real estate representative is usually
created, who holds the property of the testator until final adjudication,
then he signs it over to the heirs, on an order from the court. This
system does not change old laws but provides a new means for carrying them out. Much has been said of its tendency to foster a disposition in the people to look toward the government, the state, as the
source of title. Here the discussion might readily o off on a tangent,
and directly toward an application of sociological principles. My own
belief is that the argument is fatuous. I incline toward the standpoint
that the buyer will regard the vendor, to whom the consideration runs,
as the source of title, and the state as usual in its role of staunch protector of the people's rights. A final argument for the system of registration of title is that of ease and swiftness of transfer or encumbrance.
It is quite conceivable at least to my mind, that the present financial
condition, due in some measure to difficulties of bankers in allowing
loans on real estate, might have been of less consequence had it been
possible to pass title to real estate as quickly and easily as title to
personal property is passed, or a loan as quickly and easily arranged
on realty as on personal property. Perhaps this is too gross a supposition, still we may see a day when this system fitted as it is to a more
complex civilization, will be in widespread use. Some localities find it
adapted to their needs even now.
B. R. Desenberg.
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TRUSTS.-WHERE ONE HOLDS PROPERTY N TRUST FOR 4,N UNDISCLOSED BENEFICIARY, WILL CREDITORS WHO HAVE GIVEN THE TRUSTEE CREDIT ON THE

STRENGTH OF REPRESENTATIONS THAT TRUST PROPERTY WAS HIS OwN BE GIVEN

RIGHTS PRIOR TO THOSE OF THE UNDISCLOSED BFNEFIcrARY?-The subject of

this note, as presented in the recent case of Hummel v. Willmow, 179 N. E.
438 (Ill. 1932), raises a nice problem and leads us to inquire into the following:
What are the rights of creditors of a trustee holding property under a secret
trust when such creditors extended the credit on the representation of the trustee
that the property, in fact the subject of a secret trust was his own? What are
the rights of such creditors as against the trust beneficiary? What are the rights
of such creditors if, after credit is given, the property is conveyed to the beneficiary? In the Hummel case the question was: Would creditors who issued
credit to a husband on the strength of his representation that certain realty
was his own, and to which he had been permitted to hold the title in his own
name for 18 years, be permitted to set up their title in preference to that of
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the undisclosed beneficiary for whom the property had actually been held in
trust? The court held that the creditors would be given priority, for the beneficiary had allowed the title to remain in the hands of the husband for 18 years
during which he, on his apparent ownership (in which the beneficiary by silence
acquiesced), was extended credit which he now cannot satisfy.
Judge Learned Hand in the case of Bryant v. Klatt, 2 Fed. (2d) 167 (1924), a
case involving very similar circumstances, says that he cannot see how a court
will allow one's creditors to profit by that which was never truly the debtor's
at all, but in that case allows a recovery for that portion of the debt which was
contracted after the beneficiary had knowledge that the creditors were relying
on the trust property as security. He was loath to do this but did it on the
precedent of three cases cited and on the basis of an estoppel. However, it was
his opinion that in cases where the beneficiary was innocent of any knowledge of
reliance by the creditors of a trustee on the property the subject of a secret
trust, that as between creditors and beneficiary there were equal equities and,
following the rule of equity, the one prior in time should prevail thus giving
the beneficiary priority.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in deciding the Hummel case, does not seem
to consider this proposition. It seems to be of the opinion that when the beneficiary of an undisclosed trust placed the trustee -ina position where he might
work fraud on his creditors or permitted the trustee to assume a position whereby
he might work fraud on his creditors and by reason of such position he does
work fraud on his creditors, that the beneficiary will be estopped to exclude the
creditor from his claim and the instrument will be regarded as a conveyance for
the purpose of defrauding creditors of their rights. Quoting from the decision
in the principal case: "A married woman may have a resulting trust in real
property, yet, if she represents to the world that the husband is the owner of
the property, or if she permits him to act with respect to it in such a manner
as to induce others to believe him to be the owner, third persons extending
credit on the strength of such belief will be protected. The wife cannot, in such
case, assert a resulting trust to defeat the claim or lien of one who extended
credit to the husband on the faith of his apparent title and without notice of
the wife's equity."
It might be well at this point to consider for a moment as to what, in general,
are the rights of a creditor. He has only a general claim against a debtor; until
the claim is sued on and reduced to a judgment the creditor has no specific lien
against the property of the debtor. After judgment, it amounts to a lien against
any property possessed by the debtor.
Since the decision in the Bryant case, numerous cases have been decided
holding that creditors who extend credit in reliance upon a trustee's apparent
ownership will be protected upon the ground of an estoppel. See Pierce v. Hower,
142 Ind. 626 (1895); Roy v. McPherson, 11 Neb. 197, 7 N. W. 873 (1881);
Besson v. Eveland, 26 N. J. Eq. 468 (1875); Budd v. Atkinson, 30 N. J. Eq. 530
(1879).
In cases however where a trustee under an oral or-secret trust conveys to the
beneficiary the' conveyance cannot be set aside or impeached by the trustee's
general creditors. See Morgan v. Morgan, 252 Fed. 719 (1918); Smith v. Ellison, 80
Ark. 447, 97 S. W. 666 (1906); Fraser v. Churchman, 43 Ind. App. 200 (1908);
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Griffin, 116 Iowa 397, 90 N. W. 84 (1902);
Bailey v. Wood, 211 Mass. 37 (1912). This is on the theory that the courts
will not prevent a man from doing what he is under a moral obligation
to do. Fraser v. Churchman, supra. "While a parol trust made at the time
of the delivery of a deed is within the Statute of Frauds, nevertheless it
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supports a conveyance which would otherwise be open to attack as in fraud
of creditors." See Morgan v. Morgan, supra. In these cases nothing is presented
showing guilty knowledge on the part of the beneficiary or carlessness or that
the beneficiary had been the one who placed the trustee in the position enabling
him to work fraud. Contra: Holmes v. Winchester, 135 Mass. 299 (1883);
Bancroft v. Curtis, 108 Mass. 47 (1871). See AMEs, -CASES ON TRUSTS, vol. I,
p. 181.
The courts have even permitted the conveyance to stand although the conveyance was made after the creditor had reduced his claim to judgment and
obtained a judgment lien upon the property. See Hays v. Reger, 102 Ind. 524
(1885); Hurt v. Drew, 122 Kan. 357; Wilmer v. Dunn, 133 Md. 354, 105 Atl.
319 (1918); Siemon v. Shurck, 29 N. Y. 598 (1864); Kauffman v. Kauffman,
266 Pa. 270, 109 AtI. 640 (1920). In cases, however, where fraud is shown or
the trust beneficiary has permitted the trustee to appear of record as the apparent
owner the conveyance will be impeached and set aside. It is not intent, so much
as conduct, that determines the rights of the parties in such cases. Cf. Galbraith
v. Lunsford, 87 Tenn. 89, 9 S. W. 365 (1888); Lawrence v. Guarantee Investment
Ins. Co., 51 Kan. 222, 32 Pac. 816 (1893); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v.
Perkins, 135 Iowa 64, 110 N. W. 15 (1906); Warner v. Watson, 35 Fla. 402, 17
So. 654 (1895); PomERoY'S EQ. JuR. (3d ed.) § 814.
The Hummel case presented yet another question. Where a beneficiary of a
trust arrangement permits a trustee to hold property in such a way that he
appears to be the ostensible owner thereof and as a result the trustee secures
credit from creditors who place reliance on such ostensible ownership and the
debtor trustee after receiving such credit conveys the property to the beneficiary, will the courts permit the impeachment of such conveyance? While the
court held in that case that such a trust was not clearly and unequivocally established still, if it had been, the court would have impeached and set aside such
conveyance. Quoting, "Even, assuming that the beneficiary had a resulting trust
in the property, yet she knowingly permitted the title to remain in him of record
for 18 years, during which period through his apparent ownership of the property,
credit was extended to him, and he incurred obligations which remain unsatisfied. She cannot, by taking the title in herself place the property beyond the
reach of her husband's creditors. The conveyance will be void and fraudulent."
See Frewin v. Stark, 319 Ill. 35, 149 N. E. 588 (1925); Smith v. Wihiard, 174
Ill. 538, 51 N. E. 835 (1898) ; Hauk v. Van Ingen, 63 N. E. 705 (1902) ; Hockett
v. Bailey, 86 Ill. 74 (1877).
While the decision and doctrine of Hummel v. Villmow and corresponding
cases may seem at first blush to he harsh and unjust and while it is true, as
judge Learned Hand says in Bryant v. Klatt, that it would be giving the creditor
a better title than the debtor trustee had, still where a beneficiary by his silence
or otherwise permitted and enabled the fraud to be worked he has acquiesced
and indirectly participated in the perpetration of the fraud and should not be
allowed thereafter to save himself at the expense of the creditor. The action of
the court is entirely just, equitable and justifiable.
Although "it is making one man's property answer for the debt of another,"
yet as between two parties equally innocent of actual guilty knowledge, it is
entirely in accord with the principles of justice and equity that the one who has
made the perpetration of the fraud possible should be made to suffer rather than
the one who had neither an actual part in the fraud nor assisted in any way
in making it possible.
C. L. Randolph.

